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Merck: Property

PROPERTY
I.
A.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

Lease and Interdependent Instruments

Wilson v. McAbee 1 was an appeal from a directed verdict
for the plaintiff, a landlord. He had negotiated financial arrangements with the tenant to open a drug store which
included a mortgage loan of $21,500 secured by the tenant's
home. When the tenant went into possession of the premises
on November 1, 1963, unexpected repairs had to be made.
The evidence at trial indicated that the landlord had agreed
to make these repairs and later be reimbursed by the tenant.
When the mortgage on the tenant's home had been prepared he went to the office of his attorney to execute three
instruments: the mortgage, a lease, and a profit sharing
agreement with the landlord. The first two were signed but
the latter could not be agreed upon and was never signed.
Although the lease and the profit sharing agreement were
separate instruments the lease contained the following: "'It
is further agreed that this lease shall be a part of agreement
entered into today between the parties.' "2
The landlord, thirty months after the tenant commenced
occupancy, gave notice of termination based on the position
that the lease, although signed by the parties, was ineffectual.
He contended that, firstly, the lease was never delivered and,
secondly, it was interdependent with the profit sharing agreement, which, since it was never signed, made both ineffectual.
The tenant relied on the written lease as valid.
The court held that a recital in the lease would not make
the lease and the profit sharing agreement interdependent
but that such a relationship must be drawn by the jury from
the intentions of the parties as gathered from all the circumstances. Therefore, without consideration of the questions
raised by the tenant, a new trial was granted.

1.256 S.C. 211, 182 S.E.2d 313 (1971).
2. Id. at 211, 182 S.E.2d at 314.
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Housing Code Violation-Duty to Pay Rent

In Riley v. Nelson3 a tenant sought relief from his obligation to pay rent because of the landlord's violation of the
Housing Code.
The City of Greenville enacted the Minimum Standard
Housing Code of the City of Greenville in 1968. 4 Prior to this
the defendant had taken the plaintiff as a tenant and in 1969,
the City notified the landlord that the building occupied by
the tenant was in violation of the Housing Code. The landlord attempted to correct the violations but, in addition,
raised the rent from $8.00 to $12.00 per week. Thereupon,
the tenant ceased paying any rent. In 1970, the landlord commenced eviction proceedings and the tenant defended on the
theories that, firstly, there is no duty to pay rent on a dwelling which is below the Minimum Standard Housing Code,
and, secondly, there is no duty to pay a rental increase based
on the landlord's attempt to comply with the Code.
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized
the contentions of the tenants as based on the District of
Columbia case of Brown v. Southall Realty,5 where a lease
was found void and unenforceable on property where housing
violations existed. The Brown case, however, was distinguished in Saunders v. First National Realty Corp.6 in which
violations occurred during the tenancy, instead of prior to the
commencement. There the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals succinctly stated, "We did not hold and we now refuse to hold that violations occurring after the tenancy is
created void the lease." 7 The South Carolina Supreme Court,
without adopting the rule of the Brown case, found that since
the violations of the Housing Code occurred after the inception of the tenancy a valid lease contract remained in effect.

3. 256 S.C. 545, 183 S.E.2d 328 (1971).
4. Pursuant to provisions of S.C. CODE ANN. §§36-501-11 (1962).

5. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C.Ct.App. 1968) construed in Diamond Housing Corp.
v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492, 495 (D.C.Ct.App. 1969).
6. 245 A.2d 836 (D.C.Ct.App. 1968).
7. Id. at 638.
8. 256 S.C. 431, 182 S.E.2d 735 (1971).
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EMINENT DOMAIN

"Taking" of Private Property

In the case of Spradley v. South CarolinaState Highway
Department," the Highway Department made improvements
and widened the highway in front of the plaintiff's property.
It was found at the trial that such improvements had caused
flooding on the property and, on appeal, the question was
raised as to whether there had been sufficient evidence to
justify a finding that there had been an uncompensated taking contrary to the South Carolina Constitution.9
What constitutes a "taking" which requires compensation has become of increasing importance as public work
projects progress.1 0 The constitutional prohibition has been
interpreted as protecting all of the essential elements of ownership whether or not there is a physical invasion' and it is
a jury question whether the addition of water destroyed the
usefulness of the property.' 2 In the present case the court
decided that when the improvement causes more water to
remain on the property due to reduced drainage after the
improvement there is sufficient evidence to allow the question
of whether there has been a taking to go to the jury.
B. Damages
In Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Gasque,' 3 the power
company had instituted a condemnation proceeding against
Gasque to acquire an easement of right of way for the purpose of constructing an electric power line across 4.87 acres.
A jury impaneled by the Clerk of Court for Marion County
awarded damages to the property owner in the amount of
$2,800. Upon appeal, the Court of Common Pleas of Marion
County awarded damages in the amount of $22,000. The
9. S.C. CONST. art. I, §17.
10. See, Webb v. Greenwood County, 229 S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d 688 (1956) ;
Early v. S. C. Public Service Authority, 228 S.C. 392, 90 S.E2d 472 (1955) ;
Milhous v. State Highway Department, 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852, 128 A.L.R.
1186 (1939); Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Department, 159
S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1930).
11. See, Owens v. S. C. State Highway Dept., 239 S.C. 44, 121 S.E2d 240
(1961); Collins v. City of Greenville, 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958);
Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E2d 871 (1940).
12. Baynhan v. State Highway Dept., 181 S.C. 435, 187 S.E. 528 (1936).
13. 258 S.C. 1, 186 S.E2d 813 (1972).
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case constituted an appeal by the power company following a motion for a new trial on the theory "'that the jury
verdict [was] grossly excessive and not based on the evidence
and testimony presented in this case.' "14
The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewing the testimony at the trial level found that the verdict was not so
excessive as to warrant the conclusion that it was a result of
caprice, passion, or prejudice. Testimony on behalf of the
landlord indicated that a subdivision development plan had
already been prepared. The condemned right of way would
affect a total of 28 proposed lots and valuation of those lots,
for the purposes of awarding just compensation, was arrived at by subtracting from the value of the improved lots,
the costs of development such as water, sewage and engineering expenses. Using the estimated low figures for purposes
of this calculation, the total damage to the property owner
would be $26,500. Although witnesses for the power company
testified that the fair market value of 4.87 acres was between
$2,237.50 and $2,800, counsel at the trial did not object to
the property owner's method of valuation.
The ruling of the trial judge against granting a new
trial will not be disturbed unless the "verdict is wholly unsupported by evidence or is so excessive as to justify the inference that it was capricious or influenced by passion, prejudice or other considerations not found in the evidence."'' r
From the complete testimony the jury could have accepted a
valuation between a low of $2,237.50, and a high of $26,500.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the verdict of
$22,000 was not so excessive as to be overturned and particularly noted that there had been no objection to the landowner's testimony regarding the method of valuation.
Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Brown 6 was
another case which involved the amount of damages in a
condemnation. The trial court's'17 award of $36,500 was appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court which reversed
the lower court and ordered a new trial.
14. Id. at 3, 186 S.E2d at 814.
15. S. C. Public Service Authority v. Spearwant Liquidating Co., 196

S.C. 481, 484-85, 13 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1941).
16. 258 S.C. 148, 187 S.E2d 509 (1972).
17. Richland County Ct. Common Pleas.
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Mr. Brown owned a 500 acre tract of land north of Columbia which was suitable for future development as residential property. Over this land the power company acquired
a right of way 150 feet in width and the right to cut away
all "danger trees." Actually taken was a total of 22.67 acres
but because the right of way generally followed the perimeter
of the property a very small acreage was isolated. In the condemnation proceeding, the jury awarded damages in the
amount of $36,500 to Mr. Brown in compensation for the taking of 22.67 acres. This amount was nearly equal to that
which the power company's expert witnesses fixed as the
highest value.
The condemnation proceeding was appealed to the South
Carolina Supreme Court on the issue of whether there had
been an erroneous admission of evidence that Mr. Brown had
agreed with the power company to locate the right of way
along the perimeter. Over the objection of counsel, Mr. Brown
had been cross-examined on the allegedly agreed location of
the right of way and the power company's witnesses indicated
there had been a mutual agreement. This testimony had been
admitted by the trial judge on the theory that Mr. Brown
had a duty to minimize his damages and in anticipation of
testimony that a perimeter right of way rather than a diagonal one would reduce severance or special damages. The
South Carolina Supreme Court, however, concluded that the
testimony was wholly irrelevant to any issue in the case and
clearly prejudicial. The testimony was irrelevant because
there had been no evidence that the perimeter location enhanced, rather than minimized, appellant's damages. Furthermore, testimony that such a location had been agreed upon
impeached Mr. Brown and distracted the attention of the
jury from the real issues.' A new trial was ordered by the
-court.
C. Statute of Limitations
In the case of McCurley v. South CarolinaState Highway
Department19 the plaintiff had acquired, in 1958, property
located immediately downstream from a culvert carrying
water under a street in the City of Anderson. Although grad18. Id. at 153, 187 S.E.2d at 511; McVey v. Whittington, 248 S.C. 447,
151 S.E.2d 92 (1966); State v. Brock, 130 S.C. 252, 126 S.E. 28 (1925).
19. 256 S.C. 332, 182 S.E.2d 299 (1971).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

19721

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 12
PROPERTY SURVEYED

ual erosion had widened the stream there had been no appreciable damage to the property because the City had
construced a retaining wall. In the winter of 1964-65, however, heavy rains and the inadequacy of the culvert caused
the erosion of twenty feet of Plaintiff's property and undermined his house causing it to be uninhabitable. To remedy
the situation the City installed a second culvert on January
2, 1969.
Suit was filed against the City of Anderson and the
South Carolina Highway Department in the Court of Common Pleas, Anderson County, in February, 1969, following
the installation of the second culvert. The Highway Department, on motion, was eliminated from the case, and judgment
was had against the City on the theory that damages to the
plaintiff's property amounted to a taking without just com20
pensation.
The City appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court
on the question of whether the cause of action had been
barred by the six year statute of limitations. 21 The court held
it was not, citing Hilton v. Duke Power Co.22 as a concise
summary of South Carolina law. Although the statute of limitations begins to run upon the first occurrence of actual damage, if the injury is caused by negligence or if it is abatable
then there arises a continuing cause of action and if brought
with the statutory period the plaintiff may recover for the
23
complete injury.
The problem of determining when the statute of limitations begins to run has often been treated in other jurisdictions which usually attempt to classify the injury as
"permanent" or "recurring." In addition, some cases such as
the present one classify it as abatable or unabatable, the former being temporary, and the latter permanent. A landowner
injured by an abatable or temporary injury is considered to
have a continuing cause of action on the theory that he has a
right to assume the harm will be abated and it is impossible
24
to determine the extent of the injury in one action.
20. Id.
21. S.C. CODE ANN. §10-143 (1962).

22. 254 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1958).
23. Id. at 122. See also, Conestee Mills v. City of Greenville, 160 S.C. 10,
158 S.E. 113, 75 A.L.R. 519 (1931) and Lawton v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 75

S.C. 82, 55 S.E. 128 (1906).
24. Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 302, 338-40 (1949).
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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

Intention of the Parties
The case of Nance v. Waldrop 25 presented the court with
a question regarding the application of a restrictive covenant
to house trailers. In 1938, Robert Edwards as Trustee for
James Edwards received court approval for the sale of a 500
acre tract of James Edwards' land. The court's decree stated
that all deeds should contain a restriction prescribing that:
"'(1) said property shall be used solely for residential purposes . . . ." [sic] (2) No house shall be erected thereon
costing less than Four Thousand Five Hundred ($4,500.00)
Dollars.'-"26 In 1969, this suit was commenced to enjoin the
defendant from developing the land as a trailer park, and
from using a trailer as his personal residence. The plan to
develop a trailer park was subsequently abandoned and from
an injunction by a lower court, the defendant appealed the
question of whether he might move a mobile home, trailertype residential unit, onto the property and occupy it as a
residence without violating the restriction.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in construing the
restrictive covenant attempted to give effect to the intent of
the parties as determined from the instrument and surrounding circumstances. 27 Since the mobile home was virtually unknown in 1938, did it mean that the restriction should not be
interpreted as prohibiting placement of the trailer on defendant's lot? The court found that it did not. The restrictions
embodied in the words "residential," "house" and "erected"
indicated an intent that only homes of a conventional structure be built. 28 The court also interpreted the covenant as
prohibiting mobile homes in the light of the general building
scheme which had developed based upon these restrictions.
The adjacent area was made up of residential subdivisions and
the property owners within had relied upon the restrictions
in buying and developing their property. Therefore, the injunction of the lower court was affirmed.
A.

25. 258 S.C. 69, 187 S.E2d 226 (1972).
26. Id. at 71, 187 S.E.2d at 227.
27. Cheves v. City Council of Charleston, 140 S.C. 423, 138 S.E. 867
(1927).
28. 258 S.C. at 73, 187 S.E2d at 228; accord, Swigart v. Richards 178
N.E.2d 109 (Licking County Ct. Common Pleas, Ohio 1961); Pagal v. Gisi,
132 Colo. 181, 286 P.2d 636 (1959).
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Judge Brailsford, joined by Judge Bussey, dissented from
the court's opinion interpreting the restrictive covenants.
Since the defendant was using his property for a residential
purpose the dissenters saw the issue as whether the defendant
could be prohibited from building a house, costing less than
$4,500. The second restriction did not require that a house
be built on the lot, only that if one is built, it not cost less
than the specified amount. The defendant, by putting a mobile
home on the lot, was considered by the majority as not having
erected a conventional house, therefore, reasoned the dissenters, there had been no violation of the second restriction.
This strict construction was considered as properly promoting
the plain and obvious purposes of the instrument.2 9 The dissent analogized to the case of Schaeffer v. Gatling30 in which
a restriction limiting use to "'strictly for residential purposes" was interpreted not to prohibit house trailers if used
as residences. The general developmental scheme relied upon
by the plaintiffs, the dissent argued, would be effective to
supply restrictions omitted but could not be allowed to rewrite the restrictions themselves.
B. Radical Change in the Surrounding Area
Flinkingshelt v. Johnson3i was a declaratory judgment
proceeding to declare void certain restrictive covenants. The
order of the lower court which upheld the covenants was
affirmed in a per curiam opinion.
The particular findings of fact by the Greenville County
Court of Common Pleas comprehensively described the character of the land in question, and may be summarized as follows: In 1955, ten owners of contiguous property, for the
purpose of maintaining its residential character, recorded
restrictive covenants prescribing minimum lot sizes and single
family residences. Since then the character of the property
has remained residential and includes attractive lots and
homes. It is bounded by Pleasantburg Drive, on the other side
of which, there has been considerable commercial development
29. 258 S.C. at 74, 187 S.E.2d at 229; citing, Donald E. Blatz, Inc. v. R. V.
Chandler & Co., 248 S.C. 484, 487-488, 151 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1966); Cothran
v. Stroman, 246 S.C. 42, 44, 142 S.E2d 368 (1965); McDonald v. Welborn,
220 S.C. 10, 66 S.E.2d 327 (1951).
30. 243 Miss. 155, 137 So.2d 819 (1962).

31. 258 S.C. 77, 187 S.E.2d 233 (1972).
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including service stations, convenience food stores, bowling
alleys, theatres, parking areas, office buildings and the Greenville Technical Education Center.
The plaintiffs, owners of the property on the residential
side of Pleasantburg Drive, and whose predecessor in title
was a co-covenantor, sold lots to some of the defendants who
relied on the residential restrictions. In addition, the plaintiffs have retained some lands on the residential side and the
court found that they intended to sell it for commercial purposes at commercial prices after obtaining a court decision
voiding the restrictions.
The restrictions, according to the plaintiffs, should have
been voided for two reasons: (1) there was no general plan
or scheme for the development of all of the property subject
to the restrictions, and (2) there had been a radical change
in the character of the neighborhood which had destroyed
the essential object of the restrictions. The Greenville County
Court of Common Pleas concluded that the plaintiff's contention was not that there was a breakdown of the general
scheme within the residential area but that the adjoining
and nearby property had increased in commercial development. Relying on the case of Martin v. Cantre l3 the court
found that the plaintiffs could not base their cause of action
on changes of conditions outside the restricted area, or even
small violations within the restricted area.33 Great injustice
would occur, the court reasoned, if the plaintiffs were allowed
to sell their property to defendants relying on the residential
restrictions, and then seek a substantially greater price by selling for commercial purposes.
The court found that the residential restrictions executed in 1951 were valid and enforceable as to all property
of the plaintiffs on the residential side of Pleasantburg Drive.
Further, the court recognized that an area of commercial
development adjacent to a residential area must by necessity
have a line of demarcation somewhere and an attempt by the
plaintiffs to have the court modify the restrictions rather
than void them was not honored. The court refused to let
down gradually the restrictive bars, commenting that, without protective covenants business encroachments on the residential property would be gradual, steady and cancerous.
32. 225 S.C. 140, 81 S.E.2d 37 (1954).
33. Pitts v. Brown, 215 S.C. 122, 54 S.E.2d 538 (1949).
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IV.
A.

EASEMENTS

Transferability

Douglas v. Medical Investors, Inc.3 4 was a declaratory
judgment to determine whether the defendant had an easement for a driveway across plaintiff's property. The lower
court held that the reservation of an easement was ineffective and nontransferable and the decision was appealed.
The facts were that one McCulla had sold frontage property in a commercial area to Threadgill reserving an easement
to himself in the form of a joint driveway. Threadgill then
conveyed to the plaintiff and McCulla conveyed to the defendant.
The South Carolina Supreme Court considered two arguments advanced by the plaintiff. He argued that the reservation of the easement was repugnant to the fee simple title
and thus ineffective. He also contended that by the nature
of the easement it was not transferable.
The plaintiff had successfully argued in the lower court
that in the deed both the granting and habendum clauses conveyed fee simple title and the reservation of the easement
which followed the description of the property was inconsistent.3 5 The lower court had ruled for the plaintiff on the
principle that the granting clause cannot be cut down by
subsequent language. The supreme court disagreed, citing
Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdale,36 which recognized that an
easement may be created by reservation in a deed. The joint
driveway, in the present case, was no attempt to cut down
the fee but only retain a limited use of the property.
The second question considered by the court, the transferability of the easement, turned on whether there existed
an easement in gross or an easement appurtenant. The latter
is defined as a right to limited use of the land of another
which by its nature inheres to the land. 37 However, the gen34. 256 S.C. 440, 182 S.E.2d 720 (1971).
35. Id. at 445, 182 S.E2d at 722, Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495,
159 S.E.2d 46 (1968) ; Groce v. Southern Ry. Co., 164 S.C. 427, 162 S.E. 425
(1931), (distinguished by the court as attempts to create reversions rather
than reserve limited use).
36. 246 S.C. 414, 143 S.E.2d 803 (1965).
37. Fisher v. Fair, 34 S.C. 203, 13 S.E. 470 (1890).
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eral definition also requires that there be a dominant estate
to which the right belongs and a servient estate upon which
the obligation rests. 38 To this South Carolina adds a further
requirement that for an easement to be appurtenant one
39
terminus must be on the land of the person claiming it. If

these requirements of an easement appurtenant can be met
it is, generally, freely transferable with the land to which
it is appurtenant. 40 On the other hand, an easement in gross
is a right which is considered personal in nature41 and cannot
be transferred. In South Carolina the rule has further
evolved to such that if an easement in gross is of a commercial character it is transferable. 42 The present case is the
latest manifestation of this exception holding that if a joint
driveway in a commercial district was not an easement appurtenant it was, nevertheless, transferable because, although
in gross, it was of the commercial nature.
B.

Width of Right of Way

Patterson v. Duke Power Co. 43 considered the proper
interpretation of an easement that the power company had
over the land of three property owners. The easement did
not specify the width of a right of way but did grant the
privilege to the power company of keeping its line clear of
trees and other obstructions. In the lower court, the plaintiffs
had won a verdict for $1900.00 in damages for trespass by
the power company, which had cut valuable timber located
a considerable distance from the electrical line. The damages
were paid but the plaintiffs sought further a permanent
injunction restraining the power company from any future
trespass. Since no width of the right of way was specified in
the easement, the lower court was requested to determine the
proper width. The plaintiff and other witnesses testified that
for many years the power company had kept clear on either
side of the center of the line an area of twenty to twenty-five
feet, on the other hand, Duke asserted a right of way of ninety
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Annot.,
43.

25 A.Jua2d Easements and Licenses §11 (1966).
Shia v. Pendergrass, 222 S.C. 342, 351, 72 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1952).
25 A1iJua.2d Easements and Licenses §94 (1966).
Brasington v. Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 141 S.E. 375 (1927).
See geerally, Fisher v. Fair, 34 S.C. 203, 31 S.E. 470 (1890), also,
130 A.L.R. 1253 (1941).
256 S.C. 479, 183 S.E.2d 122 (1971).
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feet, and a right to cut "danger trees" farther off the center
line. The trial judge ruled for the plaintiffs, granting a permanent injunction and limiting the right of way easement
to a width no more than twenty-five feet on either side of
the transmission line.
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that
the proper rule for construction of an instrument which
grants a right of way not specifying the width is as follows:
When no dimensions of a way are expressed, but the object is expressed, the dimensions must be inferred to be such as are reasonably
44
sufficient for the accomplishment of that object.

The court further determined that a reasonably sufficient

right of way for the maintenance of transmission lines must
take into consideration their height, width and distance apart.
Such an easement is necessarily indefinite and especially so
where no specific provision provides for the measurement.
The injunction of the lower court limiting the right of way
to twenty-five feet from the center beneath the transmission
line was vacated and without substituting a fixed with the
court determined Duke's easement to be that of a right of
way "reasonably sufficient in width to properly operate and
maintain its transmission lines.1 45 Should the power company
clear a right of way in excess, the plaintiffs' remedy would
be at law for damages caused by trespass.
The "danger tree" provision of the easement is to be
interperted according to its plain and ordinary meaning.40
In other jurisdictions the term has meant "those trees which,
by reason of size or condition, and contiguity of complainant's
right of way, involve a concrete threat of injury to complainant's transmission or telephone lines, . . . trees which have

come to be dangerous since the grant are to be included in
the class guarded against." 47 The South Carolina Supreme
Court concluded that the power company had a right to re44. Id. at 486, 183 S.E.2d at 125 (1971), quoting, Hamlin v. Pandapas, 197
Va. 659, 90 S.E.2d 829 (1956); quoting Buckles-Irvine Coal Co. v. Kennedy
Coal Corp., 134 Va. 1, 19, 114 S.E. 233, 238 (1922) ; quoting Atkins v. Bordman, 2 Met. 457, 468 (Mass. 1841).
45. 256 S.C. at 486, 183 S.E.2d at 125.
46. 256 S.C. at 488, 183 S.E.2d at 126, citing Bruce v. Blalock, 241 S.C.
155, 127 S.E.2d 439 (1962).
47. Collins v. Alabama Power Company, 214 Ala. 643, 647, 108 So. 868,

870 (1926).
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move as danger trees any and all trees which would endanger
the proper operation of the transmission lines, whether such
trees were within or without the normal right of way necessary for the maintenance of the transmission lines.
V.

BOUNDARmS

A.

Quieting Title
The case of Dillard v. Blackman" was appealed to the
South Carolina Supreme Court from an action to quiet title.
The parties to the action had a common grantor, who in 1910
sold land designated as Lot 4 to Ellen Good, through whom
plaintiff had taken title by inheritance. In 1935, the defendant
bought the adjoining lot, No. 3, at a foreclosure sale. Both
the lots were delineated upon a plat prepared for the common
grantor in 1910. When Ellen Good took title to Lot 4 in 1910,
she planted a hedge along the boundary adjacent to Lot 3,
and at the time of suit the hedge was 60 feet long and about
four or five feet wide.
Neither party knew the exact location of the line between
the two lots, nor did it come into dispute until the plaintiff
employed a surveyor who located the -boundary line according
to the plat and consistent with all deeds. Thereafter, a suit
was commenced in which the plaintiff alleged ownership of
the strip on which the hedge was located on the theory that
the boundary between the lots had been acquiesced in or fixed
by a mutual understanding of the parties at a different location from the boundary line set forth in the deed. In support
of this contention, testimony was heard that the parties on
either side of the hedge from time to time had trimmed it
and that defendant, in Lot No. 3, had constructed a fence
on her side of the hedge. This evidence was countered by
defendant's explanation that the fence was to enclose a dog
rather than establish a boundary line. More damaging to the
plaintiff was the testimony by the defendant that she had
brought to the attention of the plaintiff the fact that the
hedge was over -theline and all mortgages out of the plaintiff
had described the property in conformity with the plat and
the deeds.
The findings of fact on the issue of acquiescence had
been made in the lower court by the master in equity and
48. 258 S.C. 158, 187 S.E.2d 643 (1972).
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were confirmed by the circuit court in favor of the defendant.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, relying on the case of
Harrisonv. Lanoway,49 held that these findings of fact were
binding since its function is not to weigh the evidence if the
conclusion may be reasonably supported. In the case of Klapman v. Hook,50 title was held to have been acquired by acquiescence and mutual -intention on undisputed facts which raised
a presumption in favor of the alleged boundary line. In the
present case, however, the court found the evidence in dispute
and affirmed the judgment of the lower court without upsetting its findings of fact.
ANTONY M. MERCK

49. 214 S.C. 294, 52 S.E.2d 264 (1949).
50. 206 S.C. 51, 32 S.E.2d 882 (1945).
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